Showing posts with label US Army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US Army. Show all posts

Friday, February 22, 2008

Army's After-Action Review Locked in Safe - Mentions Too Many Bushies

Joseph L. Galloway on the McClatchy Newspapers (Feb 21, 2008, Commentary: Some inconvenient truths, conveniently locked in a safe) writes:



One of the great strengths of the American Army that was reborn in the wake of the disastrous Vietnam War has been a rigorous After-Action Review and Lessons Learned process that’s conducted after field training exercises and battlefield combat.

Not even two- and three-star generals are exempt from standing up and acknowledging their failures in the Army’s Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), where brigade, division and corps command groups test their skills at planning and conducting major operations in computer war games. A wily opposition force (OpFor) staff does its best to make life miserable for those being tested, much as a real enemy would on the battlefield.

If a general overlooks one or two of his mistakes, an OpFor colonel follows him to the stage and points them out for him.

This program, which began in the late 1980’s, has expanded to help prepare Army National Guard commanders and their staffs for what awaits them in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Foreign military observers have been astounded by a process that requires someone wearing stars on his shoulders to criticize himself in front of an audience of lower-ranking officers and sergeants.

So it should come as no surprise that not long after Baghdad fell early in 2003, the Army’s top commanders commissioned an After-Action Review of the planning and conduct of the invasion of Iraq and the post-war occupation and reconstruction effort. The Army hired the RAND Corp., a California-based research organization that’s done this kind of work for the U.S. military and government for decades.

The study was envisioned as a seven-volume examination of the Army’s role in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

What is a surprise is that nearly three years later, RAND’s warts-and-all report on post-war reconstruction, which was completed after 18 months and presented to the Army in the summer of 2005, is still locked in Pentagon vaults.

RAND normally prepares a classified version of such reports for internal use by the Army’s commanders and a public version that covers the high points of what was found and what was recommended for the media and academic researchers.

Both versions of the volume of the report titled “Rebuilding Iraq” are locked
in the same vault
, where they can do no good in educating officers or the American public to the realities that led to a near-catastrophic failure by both the military and civilians to plan for what would happen after we’d toppled Saddam Hussein’s government and assumed control of a fractured, feuding nation of 25 million people.


The trouble, it seems, was that RAND’s team of more than 50 civilian and military researchers followed the trail of the failure from the Army’s part of the Pentagon to former Defense Secretary Donald L. Rumsfeld’s offices and on to the White House and State Department and elsewhere in the Bush administration.

The New York Times got its hands on a draft copy of the report and says that the RAND Corp. researchers found problems with virtually every organization involved in planning the war _ not exactly a surprise to anyone who’s read the newspaper articles and books published on a war that’s about to enter its sixth year with no end in sight.

The study blamed President Bush and, by implication, his national security adviser at the time, Condoleezza Rice, for failing to resolve differences between rival agencies, i.e. Rumsfeld’s Pentagon and Colin Powell’s State Department.

Rumsfeld demanded and got sole authority for the Defense Department to oversee post-war operations in Iraq, despite what the report called the military’s “lack of capacity for civilian reconstruction planning and execution.”

Powell’s State Department produced a huge study on post-war governance and reconstruction that Rumsfeld’s people ignored even though they did no planning of their own. RAND found that State’s effort was of “uneven quality” and wasn’t “an actionable plan.”

RAND said that now-retired Army Gen. Tommy Franks, who as head of the Central Command was in charge of U.S. military operations in Iraq, had a “fundamental misunderstanding” of what was necessary to secure Iraq after Baghdad fell and assumed that U.S. civilian administrators would handle reconstruction.

At the heart of the costly failure to plan for a lengthy occupation of Iraq was
an assumption
by Rumsfeld and the White House that we could begin withdrawing American troops by the early summer of 2003 and so there’d be no need to plan for securing the country or rebuilding an infrastructure that was ancient and crude before the war and much worse afterward.


RAND’s report with its unpleasant truths landed on top Army commander’s desks at a time when President Bush and his merry band were trying to ward off a rising tide of criticism of their conduct of the war and creating yet another fairy tale, which debuted in the fall of 2005 as the “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.”

The Army brass had no intention of dropping that volume on the desk of their volatile boss Rumsfeld, and simply locked it away in hopes that it would be forgotten.

The official explanation for why the study was hidden? “Some of the RAND findings and recommendations were determined to be outside the purview of the Army and therefore of limited value in informing Army policies, programs and priorities,” an Army spokesman told The Times.

What it really was when you think about it was an inconvenient and dangerous truth, much like the one a preceding Army Chief, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki told a Senate committee on the eve of the war. No one listened to him, either.


The outrageous assumptions being made all over the administration begs the question: what the hell were they doing? On what ball did they have their eyes on? Perhaps it was something that didn't have anything to do with the war ... perhaps the war was merely a means to achieve something else. Given the recent fire at Iraq's Central Bank destroyed its records, which were in the process of having differences reconciled with various international institutions, and given that the computer expert from Bearing Point responsible for "computerizing Iraq's financial records" was kidnapped last May, exactly what was happening at the Iraq Central Bank? And who did it involve on this side of the pond? Iraq's financial records would probably have the records of the transfers of funds for prohibited weaponry, sold to it by the UK and the US throughout the sanctions -- precisely the information the US deleted from Iraq's report to the UN prior to the war (see US Illegally Removes Pages from Iraq UN Report, from ProjectCensored, and Corporate Suppliers for Iraq's Weapons Programs, and Helping Iraq Kill with Chemical Weapons:The Relevance of Yesterday's US Hypocrisy Today, and A US Media Mystery: The Case of the Missing Information about Iraq’s Weapons, and Top Secret Iraq Weapons Report Says the U.S. Government & Corporations Helped to Illegally Arm Iraq ). Iraq's financial records, and the tracing of them through international institutions would have led to the non-U.S. suppliers, all the way up the chain to the U.S. suppliers, such as Bechtel, who actually threatened to use non-U.S. suppliers to evade the sanctions. Just how many U.S. defense - biological, chemical, and nuclear - companies, who supplied Saddam throughout the 1980s were using that very same mechanism to mask their evasion of the sanctions throughout the 1990s and 2000s - arming Saddam with precisely the items that would be used to justify the invasion of Iraq? These are the very same companies who then profitted off of the war (see Windfalls of War, and Windfalls of War II).

This begs the question: have over a million Iraqis been killed (mostly women and children), and thousands of our own soldiers and civilians killed and tens of thousands maimed, so that the CEOs of weapons manufacturers in the US and UK won't be writing checks for fines and spending a meager few months in minimum security prisons, golfing all day long?

Perhaps it is that the financial trail to them was too plain. What would Americans think ... profiteers arming a madman, perhaps breaking sanctions to arm him further, in order to invade his nation because of the arms, and then reaping even greater profits in supporting the invasion and nation building?

What a successful little business model the boys have, and all its cost is over a million lives and our economy.

Thursday, December 20, 2007

US Army to Grow

Lolita Baldor of the Associated Press reports on the Seattle Post-Intelligencer:

The Pentagon will send six new combat brigades to bases in Texas, Georgia and Colorado in the coming years as part of an extensive plan to increase the size of the Army.

...Fort Bliss in Texas, Fort Carson in Colorado and Fort Stewart in Georgia will be big winners, each getting two new combat brigades. But every Army installation across the country will see more soldiers -- anywhere from a few to thousands.

A brigade is generally about 3,500 soldiers...

...Three of the support brigades also will go to Texas -- with an air defense brigade and a logistics brigade going to Fort Hood, and another unit going to Fort Bliss. The other support brigades would be scattered around the U.S. -- with two going to Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, one to Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri, one to Fort Lewis and one to Fort Polk in Louisiana.

In addition, a support unit in Fort Irwin, Calif., will shift to Fort Richardson in Alaska, and another will go from Hawaii to Fort Drum in New York.

The massive plan will impact 304 Army installations, including 380,000 soldiers and family members. The construction projects include 69,000 barracks spaces, 4,100 family housing units and 66 child centers.

Plans are to increase the number of the active-duty Army, Army Guard and Army Reserve by 74,000 overall, with the active-duty force growing by 65,000 to a total of 547,000. In October, top Army leaders said they planned to move faster to increase the size of the force -- adding the full 74,000 soldiers by 2010, two years sooner than originally planned....

Friday, December 7, 2007

The Army's $200 Billion Makeover

Alec Klein at the Washington Post has a fascinating article on the modernization of the US Army, the most far-reaching effort in over half a century, The Army's $200 Billion Makeover:


The project originated in part in 1995 when Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr., now retired, launched a series of war games. As director of the Army After Next project, his job was to divine the nature of war a quarter century hence. So Scales assembled a team of about 700, including members of the Army, Air Force, Marines, the CIA and civilian scientists, who warred over the next two years in a huge simulation center at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. "The Army had never done it -- they thought I was off my rocker," he said.

The blue team represented the Americans. The red were the Iranians, who in one scenario captured
Riyadh and began executing the royal Saudi family on live television. That drew the blue team into the streets of Riyadh, which, choked with heavy armor, became a bloody mess. Scales, building on earlier military research, realized that the United States needed a lighter, highly mobile force.

He called it the "Aha moment."

Then a fiasco hastened the Army's commitment to modernize. In 1999, the Army was bogged down in muddy logistics as it sought to move Apache helicopters into
Albania so they could be used in the Kosovo war. They didn't make it before the fight ended, an embarrassment that prompted Army Chief of Staff Eric K. Shinseki to declare that the service needed to get lighter and faster -- quickly.

In 2000, the Project for the New American Century (our current crop of neo-cons) delivered the gem, "Rebuilding America's Defenses":


...V. CREATING TOMORROW’S DOMINANT FORCE


To preserve American military preeminence in the coming decades, the
Department of Defense must move more aggressively to experiment with new
technologies and operational concepts, and seek to exploit the emerging
revolution in military affairs.... the Pentagon, constrained by limited budgets
and pressing current missions, has seen funding for experimentation and
transformation crowded out in recent years.

Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework
of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. The
United States cannot simply declare a “strategic pause” while experimenting
with new technologies and operational concepts. Nor can it choose to
pursue a transformation strategy that would decouple American and allied
interests. A transformation strategy that solely pursued capabilities for
projecting force from the United States, for example, and sacrificed
forward basing and presence, would be at odds with larger American policy
goals and would trouble American allies.

Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary
change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing
event –
like a new Pearl Harbor....


-- REBUILDING AMERICA’S DEFENSES
Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century
A Report of The Project for the New American Century
September 2000



... And within the year, the miracle happened.